Chris Matthews On ‘Wag The Dog’ Theory For Trump’s Syria Raid

Apologies to readers. It seems that at least one mainstream US journalist did suspect that Trump’s bombing raid on Syria was not about concern for those ‘beautiful babies’ killed in the alleged gas attack by Assad but was motivated more by an opportunity to put clear blue water between himself and Russian leader Vladimir Putin,

Here he is on his MSNBC show before US tomahawk missiles were launched  suggesting that Trump’s need to get out from under the burgeoning Putin scandal might be his motivation:

Why The US Media Loved Trump’s Strike In Syria

Former Public Editor for The New York Times and currently media columnist for The Washington Post, Margaret Sullivan explains why the American media are such suckers for a missile explosion or two.

Exactly the same mechanism enabled Bush and Cheney to sell a false bill of goods on Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction and the world is still paying the price. Trump has found the best way to silence his media critics; don’t call them names, just fire Tomahawk missiles at brown-skinned people in far off places.

The media loved Trump’s show of military might. Are we really doing this again?

Media Columnist April 8 at 1:37 PM

The cruise missiles struck, and many in the mainstream media fawned.

“I think Donald Trump became president of the United States last night,” declared Fareed Zakaria on CNN, after the firing of 59 missiles at a Syrian military airfield late Thursday night. (His words sounded familiar, since CNN’s Van Jones made a nearly identical pronouncement after Trump’s first address to Congress.)

“On Syria attack, Trump’s heart came first,” read a New York Times headline.
“President Trump has done the right thing and I salute him for it,” wrote the Wall Street Journal’s Bret Stephens — a frequent Trump critic and Pulitzer Prize-winning conservative columnist. He added: “Now destroy the Assad regime for good.”

Brian Williams, on MSNBC, seemed mesmerized by the images of the strikes provided by the Pentagon. He used the word “beautiful” three times and alluded to a Leonard Cohen lyric — “I am guided by the beauty of our weapons” — without apparent irony.

Quite the pivot, for some. Assessing Trump’s presidency a few weeks ago, Zakaria wrote that while the Romans recommended keeping people happy with bread and circuses, “so far, all we have gotten is the circus.” And the Times has been so tough on Trump that the president rarely refers to the paper without “failing” or “fake” as a descriptor.

 The Department of Defense released video of the U.S. military launching cruise missiles in Syria after President Trump ordered the strike on April 6. (Department of Defense)

But after the strikes, praise flowed like wedding champagne — especially on cable news.

“Guest after guest is gushing. From MSNBC to CNN, Trump is receiving his best night of press so far,” wrote Sam Sacks, a Washington podcaster and journalist. “And all he had to do was start a war.”

Why do so many in the news media love a show of force?

“There is no faster way to bring public support than to pursue military action,” said Ken Paulson, head of the Newseum Institute’s First Amendment Center.

“It’s a pattern not only in American history, but in world history. We rally around the commander in chief — and that’s understandable.”

Paulson noted that the news media also “seem to get bored with their own narrative” about Trump’s failings, and they welcome a chance to switch it up.

But that’s not good enough, he said: “The watchdog has to have clear vision and not just a sporadic bark.”

 Clara Jeffery, editor in chief of Mother Jones, offered a simple explanation: “It’s dramatic. It’s good for TV, reporters get caught up in the moment, or, worse, jingoism.”

She added: “Military action is viewed as inherently nonpartisan, opposition or skepticism as partisan. News organizations that are fearful of looking partisan can fall into the trap of failing to provide context.”

And so, empathy as the president’s clear motivation is accepted, she said — “with no mention of the refugee ban keeping those kids out, no mention of Islamophobia that has informed his campaign and administration. How can you write about motive and not explore that hypocrisy?”

Mocking “the instant elevation of Trump into a serious and respected war leader,” Glenn Greenwald in the Intercept recalled John Jay, one of the Federalist Papers authors, who wrote more than 200 years ago: “However disgraceful it may be to human nature . . . nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it.”

In fact, Jay wrote, “absolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get nothing by it” — except, of course, to scratch that eternal itch for military glory, revenge or self-aggrandizement.

Groupthink, and a lack of proper skepticism, is something that we’ve seen many times before as the American news media watches an administration step to the brink of war.

Most notoriously, perhaps, that was true in the run-up to the Iraq invasion in 2003, the start of a long disaster there.

Stephen Walt, Harvard professor of international affairs, thinks the press and the public should have learned some things by now.

“Syria remains a tragedy because there are no good options,” he wrote in Foreign Policy, and America’s interventions in the Middle East very seldom end well.

Walt later told me that the news media now must look forward and ask deeper questions.

Missile strikes may seem thrilling, and retaliation righteous.

But journalists and commentators ought to remember the duller virtues, too, like skepticism, depth and context.

And keep their eyes fixed firmly there, not on the spectacular images in the sky.

Trump’s Syrian Strike: The Onion Breaks US Media Silence On The Real Motive

As most of the mainstream US media greets Trump’s strike against Syrian leader Bashar Assad with almost orgasmic glee and as a comforting sign that the new resident of the White House will turn out to be every bit as brutish to black and brown foreigners as any of his predecessors, it has been left to the satirical website, ‘The Onion’ to tell the story of what may be the real reason for the attack. Enjoy:

Trump Confident U.S. Military Strike On Syria Wiped Out Russian Scandal

WASHINGTON—After ordering the first U.S. military attack against the regime of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, President Donald Trump held a press conference Friday to express his full confidence that the airstrike had completely wiped out the lingering Russian scandal. “Based on intelligence we have received over the past several hours, the attack on the al-Shayrat air base in Homs has successfully eliminated all discussions and allegations about my administration’s ties to the Russian government,” said Trump, adding that at approximately 4:40 a.m. local time, 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from U.S. naval ships obliterated all traces of the widespread controversy in news outlets across the media. “Ordering this strike was not a decision I took lightly, but given that it was the only way to decisively eradicate any attention being paid to congressional investigations into possible collusion between key members of my staff and high-ranking Kremlin officials, I decided it was a necessary course of action. If we learn that any remnants of this scandal remain after this attack, I will not hesitate to order further strikes.” Trump went on to say that he is leaving the option open for a potential ground invasion of Syria if any troubling evidence emerges that the Russian government manipulated the outcome of the 2016 presidential election.

Image

Scappaticci’s Cover Is Blown!

Scappaticci: The Wilsey Tape

Next week BBC Panorama will be airing a programme on the activities of Freddie Scappaticci, one of Britain’s most valued agents deep inside the IRA. In anticipation, thebrokenelbow.com is publishing here the full text of a 2012 admission from Britain’s most senior soldier in Northern Ireland at the time of Scappaticci’s heyday, that the British spy interrogated and killed suspected agents with the knowledge and approval of the British intelligence agencies, MI5 and the RUC Special Branch.

General Sir John Wilsey

Back in April 2012, former British Army Force Research Unit (FRU) soldier Ian Hurst, aka ‘Martin Ingram’, phoned the retired British Army GOC in Northern Ireland, General Sir John Wilsey at his home in Devonshire and, pretending to be a television journalist, interviewed him at length about the IRA double agent, Freddie Scappaticci, code-named Steak Knife.

Ian Hurst, aka Martin Ingram, pictured in his days as an undercover soldier with the Force Research Unit, the British Army’s intelligence gathering unit

Hurst had for some years been campaigning to expose Scappaticci’s activities largely on moral grounds, arguing that the British state had effectively sanctioned murder by allowing the IRA agent to participate in the execution of alleged informers.

Hurst discovered Scappaticci’s role by chance when on duty in the FRU office one night when the phone rang. On the other end an RUC constable said a drunk driving suspect had given them the FRU’s phone number after he was arrested with a request for help. He checked the files and discovered the truth.

The British Ministry of Defence took Hurst, who used the pseudonym ‘Martin Ingram’ in his dealings with the media, to court in a bid to silence him. His home was also burglarised and research material stolen. The MoD also won a court injunction forbidding Hurst from publicising the code name ‘Steak Knife’. Hurst then began referring to Scappaticci as ‘Stakeknife’, a ruse copied by the media.

Wilsey was GOC between 1990 and 1993 and personally met with Scappaticci to assure him that he would be protected from the Stevens inquiry, then probing links between the security forces in Northern Ireland and Loyalist paramilitaries. Describing him as ‘our best agent’, ‘the golden egg’ and ‘the military’s most valuable asset’, Wilsey confirmed that Scappaticci was the British spy working for the FRU with the codename Steak Knife.

Scappaticci’s job in the IRA was as one of its spycatchers. He tracked down British agents in the IRA’s ranks, helped to interrogate and extract confessions  from them and finally could be, and was involved in killing them.

Freddie Scappaticci, with black moustache, was perhaps the most feared of all IRA activists. His codename as a British spy was Steak Knife

Wilsey admits that he knew this and one reading of his answers suggests that Scappaticci was allowed to kill by his handlers. ‘Well, the argument is that you balance the good with the bad, didn’t you?’, he says.

Wilsey also claimed that the job of the FRU was to pass on intelligence provided by Scappaticci to MI5 and the RUC who acted on it: ‘I was responsible only for feeding them, administering them and promoting them and preparing with them…’

His answer suggests that the current police investigation into Scappaticci’s activity headed by Bedfordshire chief constable Jon Boutcher, will encounter a great deal of buck passing on the part of Britain’s intelligence agencies.

Wilsey is extraordinarily, even foolishly frank in his conversation with Hurst. He makes no effort to check Hurst’s identity and reveals highly secret information almost without thought. At one point Hurst asks him who the head of MI5 in Northern Ireland was during his tenure as GOC and his answer is mortifyingly frank: ‘Well, I don’t think I better tell you. Well, his name is Colin Powers.’

Full marks to Ian Hurst though. A wonderful performance from an intelligence pro.

Below is the audio of the interview (which can be accessed here if the link has broken) followed by the transcript. Enjoy:

Transcript of telephone call: Gen Sir John Wilsey/ Stakeknife

Transcript of telephone call 1. 11 PM, Saturday, 14 April 2012

General Sir John Finlay Willasey Wilsey GCB, CBE, DL being interviewed by Jeremy Giles.
**************************************************

00:01 Speaker 1: Hello?

00:01 Jeremy Giles: Hi. Can I speak to General Jones please, sir?

00:04 S1: Who’s speaking?

00:05 JG: My name’s Jeremy Giles.

00:07 S1: Hello there.

00:08 JG: Good morning, sir. I spoke to your wife this morning.

00:11 S1: Right.

00:13 JG: I tell you what it is, sir. Andrew Vallance gave me your details.

00:17 S1: Who did? Sorry?

00:18 JG: Andrew Vallance, the D-Notice.

00:21 S1: Right.

00:23 JG: I tell you what it is, sir. We’re doing some research on a program for Channel 4 and we’ve got some documents which feature you. And really, I was wondering whether I could come down and see you?

00:38 S1: Oh, right. So you’re a television program or journalist or something like that, are you?

00:42 JG: Yeah. I’m a journalist, sir. Yeah.

00:44 S1: Right. And the…

00:44 JG: That’s how we got a hold of Andrew Vallance, he’s the Chairman of the D-Notice committee.

00:49 S1: Oh, I see. Yes.

00:51 JG: And basically, the quite serious matters were… There are documents but there’s also recording of you admitting to be in a car with Fred Scappaticci.

01:08 S1: I was in a car with him?

01:09 JG: Yeah, inSouth Belfast. And it’s recorded in some contact forms that we have.

01:15 S1: That doesn’t sound right to me. I don’t know Fred Scappa… Who is he?

01:23 JG: You don’t know who Fred Scappaticci is?

01:25 S1: No, not by that name. No.

01:28 JG: Well, you know him as “Steak Knife”.

01:30 S1: Oh, that chap. Yes, sorry. Yes, yes, yeah.

01:33 JG: Yeah.

01:34 S1: Yeah.

01:35 S1: The point of that being…

01:36 S1: But I’ve never been in a car with him.

01:37 JG: Sorry?

01:38 S1: Never. I’ve never been in a car with him.

01:40 JG: Yes. You had… Well, you were on the outside of a car but you had a meeting in South Belfast in 1993.

01:49 S1: Right.

01:50 JG: Is that right, sir?

01:53 S1: Well, this is all teen    ger stuff, isn’t it? I mean, Fred Scappaticci…

01:56 JG: It is sir but what I’m saying is, before I come down, I just wanted to give you the opportunity of either saying “yes” or “no.” And clearly, there is a recording of you discussing this with another journalist fairly recently.

02:13 S1: Right.

02:14 JG: And what I don’t want to do, sir, is to mislead you. I just wanted to be clear as to the reasons why, if you allowed me to come down… It wouldn’t be on camera but I’d like the opportunity of showing you some documentation. As you know, the Force Research Unit, they produce the contact forms and they record that you were concerned you would be subject to some interest by Lord Stevens.

02:43 S1: Oh, right. Yeah, the Stevens thing. Yes, yeah.

02:45 JG: Yes. And that was your concern as to your motivation why you made that meeting with Mr. Scappaticci?

02:53 S1: Well, yes. I mean… What happened is the Head of the Intelligence in Northern Ireland came to see me and said that Stevens was burrowing around and that Fred chap, whatever his name is, Steak Knife, was unsettled and would I go and see him and reassure him to the value of his work.

03:15 JG: Yes. No and…

03:17 S1: And that’s what I did, but I never went in a car with him.

03:20 JG: No, but you were on the outside… You were in South Belfast, if I understood.

03:23 S1: Yeah. Yes. Well it took place in Belfast. Yes, yeah.

03:26 JG: Yeah. What I understood was and from what I gathered from the documents was that there was only you and him together and…

03:37 S1: That is correct. Yes.

03:38 JG: Yeah, I mean that’s how I understood it, sir.

03:40 S1: Yeah.

03:41 JG: I mean the detail, I don’t think is… How can I put this? I don’t think it’s of such gravity that it would never get in a TV program.

03:54 S1: I wouldn’t have thought so. I mean, he was outed by Stevens, wasn’t he?

03:57 JG: Well he was, sir. Yeah, I mean there’s…

04:00 S1: I thought it was the most terribly unprofessional business but he was outed by Stevens. Yeah.

04:05 JG: Absolutely. And by the way, I did read your book as well, sir, and I was looking at the references to narrow it down.

04:10 S1: And I didn’t mention his name in the book at all.

04:13 JG: No, I noticed that. So that’s why I was going to ask you because clearly, that was… Your roster details would’ve featured, I would suggest, quite prominently given that your period, your tenure, was a very political moment…

04:28 S1: Yes. Yes, absolutely.

04:29 JG: When the peace process was taking some hold.

04:33 S1: Yes, absolutely.

04:34 JG: And given Mr. Scappaticci’s role, clearly, it would be extremely unusual for a GOC to get in a car with an agent and it must’ve been a very serious situation for that to have happened.

04:51 S1: Well see, I’ve explained the seriousness of the situation: He was fed up with Stevens. He was worried about Stevens.

04:59 JG: No. I appreciate that sir, but there must be, and I don’t say there must be, but there would have been other agents who would have been concerned about things like Brian Nelson, Stevens, but you wouldn’t have got in the car with any other agent. It had to be a serious situation for that…

05:19 S1: Well, he was our best agent, as you know.

05:22 JG: Yes. I understand that, sir. Would you have been able to reassure him? Would that have been the outcome?

05:30 S1: I did reassure him. Yes, yes.

05:32 JG: And did he then go on to continue in his work?

05:35 S1: Well, as far as I know, yes. Because I never so who the product was. You would just see these intelligence reports.

05:41 JG: Yes, sir.

05:42 S1: They didn’t name the so-and-so said.
[chuckle]

05:45 JG: Yeah. And I mean I appreciate that, sir. On the contact forms that we’ve seen, it clearly does demonstrate or detail your involvement, but it’s a contact form, so if it actually does detail the agent’s name and welfare and all those sorts of issues, but any product which is generated clearly doesn’t.

06:10 S1: Exactly. But I don’t know whether… As far as I know, because I spoke to the man who asked me to go and see him. I spoke to that man later and he said, “Oh yeah. No, he’s fine. He’s much reassured.”

06:21 JG: Good. Okay, sir. That’s just fine. Can I just… I’m happy with the Scappaticci sir.

06:26 S1: Yes, of course.

06:28 JG: And we can deal with that separately, if that’s okay with you.

06:30 S1: Yeah, of course.

06:33 JG: The book, your book sir, when it deals with issues when you were, I think you were a company commander, were you during at the time of Narrow Water?

06:42 S1: In North Belfast. I was a CO in South Armagh, and that’s Warrenpoint your talking about, isn’t it?

06:49 JG: It is, sir, yeah. I always…

06:51 S1: I was the CO. I had been until two weeks previously. No. Sorry. I was the incoming CO in South Armagh.

07:02 JG: You were the incoming CO.

07:04 S1: Yes.

07:05 JG: Had you actually taken up position? Or…

07:06 S1: No, not yet. No. I hadn’t, no.

07:09 JG: Were you on a handover?

07:10 S1: No. It was the August Bank holiday, if I remember rightly.

07:13 JG: But you weren’t in theatre?

07:15 S1: I was not in theatre, no.

07:17 JG: Where were you at that time, sir?

07:19 S1: I was commanding my regiment.

07:21 JG: In the UK?

07:22 S1: In Colchester.

07:24 JG: Okay, sir. Can I ask you a question then, sir?

07:28 S1: Of course.

07:28 JG: When you come into theatre, as the CO in…

07:33 S1: In South Armagh.

07:34 JG: Were you on a roulement detachment then?

07:35 S1: In South Armagh, in Bessbrook Mill, yeah.

07:38 JG: And was it on the three-month deployment?

07:40 S1: Yes. Well, it was actually six months by then, I think.

07:43 JG: So roulement.

07:44 S1: Yeah, it was a roulement. Yeah it was.

07:46 JG: So when you come in, would you have been then aware of any concerns in regards to, what’s the word I’m looking for, whether there was any intelligence generated?

08:02 S1: Well, yes. We were always concerned about intelligence as the book states. We never used to get any intelligence and that was always the terrible disappointment thing. We never used to get any contact intelligence.

08:15 JG: You never, but as a company commander… Sorry, as the CO of a regiment, presumably you wouldn’t have received quality intelligence. You would have got the stuff that’s produced by the local unit intelligence officer.

08:31 S1: Absolutely, and also the RUC and, as my book states, the trouble was that a regiment would arrive. It would take time to get established and the police would stuff out the regiment and see whether they were competent in the way they handled things or not, and then perhaps towards the end of their time, they would drop a bit of a useful for intelligence in the pond.

08:55 JG: But you would never see FRU product?

08:58 S1: You would never see who it came from, no never.

08:59 JG: No, you would never see force research of product as the CO of that unit. Obviously, at the GOC, you saw FRU product but when you were the CO of that roulement, of that battalion in South Armagh, you would never have seen any intelligence product generated by the Force Research Unit?

09:19 S1: You never knew where they come from.

09:23 JG: You would know it was a unit, wouldn’t you? You’d know from a MISR what unit it came…

09:28 S1: No, you never saw… I never saw the MISR’s.

09:30 JG: You never saw… That’s the point that I was making, sir. You never saw FRU. All MISR’s are generated by the Force Research Unit.

09:37 S1: Yeah, absolutely.

09:38 JG: So you didn’t see any product down that…

09:42 S1: No, what would happen is if someone would arrive, a policemen would arrive or a member of the regiment would arrive and say, “We’ve got an interesting one here and we would like you to stake out Forkhill”, or something like that. And that’s the nearest we got to it.

09:56 JG: Okay, sir. And you would never have any dealings with the Garda?

10:00 S1: And we had no dealings whatsoever with the Garda, ever, ever, ever, ever.
[laughter]

10:03 JG: Even when you was a GOC, sir, you wouldn’t have had any…

10:05 S1: I had no dealings with the Garda at all. Anything that happened with the Garda would have gone through the chief constable.

10:12 JG: Yeah, I understand sir.

10:14 S1: The Garda was off limits.

10:15 JG: Can I ask you, sir, you say it was off limits, was that purely geopolitics?

10:21 S1: As I understood it was pure politics, yes. I mean, I think it probably came from the other side of the border in the sense that the Garda didn’t recognise the existence of the British Army because, of course, we were a foreign power at the time.

10:37 JG: Yes, sir. And would that have been the attitude which was, you understood, to be in place during 1990 and 1993?

10:47 S1: Absolutely.

10:49 JG: I mean, it’s different today, I suppose.

10:51 S1: It’s very different today, yes. Yeah.

10:53 JG: And who would the Secretary of State been then, sir?

10:55 S1: I had Peter Brooke and Paddy Mayhew.

10:58 JG: And would they have been supportive politically if you were to have said to them, could we have some cross border liaison?

11:08 S1: Oh, I often said, could we have some… I used to make… Of course, when I was in South Armagh, it wasn’t Paddy Mayhew and Peter Brooke. That’s was when I was GOC. I think it was Tom King probably at the time.

11:20 JG: But when GOC, clearly…

11:22 S1: When I was GOC, I had Peter Brooke and Paddy Mayhew, and I was forever saying to them, we must improve this, and of course, it was of our great frustrations. We would never improve.

11:32 JG: As a Five Star, you would presumably expect to have had some means of communication with your equivalent in the Irish set?

11:43 S1: Army, yeah. But I had none whatsoever.

11:46 JG: What would happen, sir, in this situation if you had hot pursuit for once in a better…

11:53 S1: Well, it’s a very good question. As things improved politically, they relaxed the hot pursuit rules, and if I remember it rightly, the hot pursuit was allowed by air. So the helicopter would like to fly over the border, so I think at depths of about five miles in hot pursuit. The ground troops were still not allowed to get in hot pursuit.

12:19 JG: So there is never any ground. As GOC, sir, did you ever authorise any cross border?

12:27 S1: None at all.

12:29 JG: I am talking, perhaps, not normal units. Let me put it that way.

12:34 S1: No we never did. And it was absolutely strictly taboo. It was one of the great taboos. We knew that there was any suggestion, that anyone is going across the border, there will be an uproar in Dublin and that would get to Westminster and then come down to us.

12:51 JG: You know that had been authorised previously by your predecessors.

12:56 S1: As GOC?

12:57 JG: As GOC, yeah.

12:59 S1: Well, I think that they’d have got into deep trouble about it.

13:02 JG: Well, they may have done sir, but we’ve got documentation that shows that there has been previous FRU activities which were authorised by your…

13:11 S1: Well, I think, in the early days but I think there is such a…

13:15 JG: No, that is the point that I was making.

13:18 S1: I never did it anyway.

13:19 JG: No, I’m not suggesting you did sir but what I am saying is previous GOC’s had authorised.

13:25 S1: I’m sure, yeah. There were very bad relationships at various times.

13:30 JG: Yeah…

13:33 S1: The Creasey period was…

13:35 JG: The politics.

13:36 S1: Was very bad time.

13:37 JG: It is basically politics. In the 80s, when you were down in South Armagh. That was very difficult, when there was mistrust and suspicion on both sides of the…

13:49 S1: Absolutely, and I decided that we play straight it. So we played it straight.

13:53 JG: Thankfully, sir, we are in a better position today aren’t we? I mean today its…

13:57 S1: Today, it must be March month already. Yes, I am sure.

14:00 JG: Can I ask you sir, when you… Again, the GOC, so the period 92 to 93, clearly, you wer e the GOC at that time, when Brigadier Ian Liles, produced these reports on after the Breen and Buchanan.

14:17 S1: Of course, I am inside of that, Brigadier Wild?

14:20 JG: No Ian Liles.

14:22 S1: Ian Liles?

14:22 JG: He is a Brigadier today sir. I am not sure he was a Brigadier then, but he produced a report which was shortly after the murder of the two more senior police officers, Mr. Breen and Mr. Buchanan.

14:37 S1: Mr. Breen, well, that was much earlier. I think that was in ’82, isn’t it?

14:41 JG: No, it was later on in ’89 sir, but…

14:45 S1: ’89, yeah.

14:47 JG: The report was made during your tenure, I understand.

14:51 S1: Right, okay.

14:51 JG: But I don’t know whether you remember seeing it.

14:53 S1: No, I didn’t definitely.

14:54 JG: As a GOC though, perhaps, you see thousands of documents and it might…

15:00 S1: I don’t remember seeing anything by a chap of that name, no.

15:02 JG: You don’t remember his name. That is where they are helpful, sir, because that does help me just to chart things as to who had knowledge of what points. I mean my only interest in that is to make sure that we don’t tread on a landmine by going down and having you that isn’t correct for want of a better expression.

15:26 S1: I don’t think so. I mean I didn’t clear my… I clear my book with the Ministry of Defence and I had no comments whatsoever on it. So it’s a pretty anodyne stuff, and I did not want to kick sand in the eyes of the IRA or the police or anybody else, or the republic.

15:45 JG: I think your book is a good read sir, if I may add. Did you write it yourself or did you have…

15:49 S1: I did it entirely myself. Yes.

15:51 JG: I suspect that you did sir because it has come from a very military perspective, but I enjoyed the read and…

15:59 S1: Well, I’m glad you did. It’s great, yeah.

16:00 JG: I was slightly disappointed you didn’t add the material about Mr. Scappaticci or at least why–not that the incident took place, because I understand why you did not make reference to that-but the fact that there was concerns regarding you detail what has been one of the most valuable assets.

16:24 S1: Well, you have to remember that the military background was such that we knew we had this source, Steak Knife, and it was the golden egg. It was the one thing that was terribly important to the army. So we never ever, ever mention the words “Steak Knife”, or whatever he subsequently became. I think it was 2001 or something like that.

16:54 JG: What about the police, sir, would they have had…

16:57 S1: Well, they were trying to get him off us.

17:00 JG: They were trying to pinch him?

17:02 S1: Get him off. They wanted to run him himself, you see.

17:05 JG: Okay, sir. That makes sense.

17:07 S1: And, as I explained in the book, Fred did not want to get with the police. He thought they were sectarian and he did not want to be handled by MI5 or MI6. He thought that they were whole lot of sort of university poofters and so on.

17:21 JG: And so that is the reason that you came into…

17:26 S1: So we were terribly cagey about Fred.

17:29 JG: Had he been compromised at that time sir? Or…

17:31 S1: No, he hadn’t. Absolutely, not.

17:32 JG: So he was still active within…

17:35 S1: And he was the most valuable asset and he was probably the military’s most valuable asset.

17:41 JG: And so, at that point, it was the damage limitation as that you could say. You wanted to keep him on board.

17:50 S1: When I said I was going to write my book, there was an absolute uproar about it and the first chapter, with the chapter that I wrote first was the one and I write it because I knew his handler, who is in my regiment.

18:04 JG: You mean his original handler?

18:05 S1: His original handler which is… His name is Jones and who is truly the chap I wrote about.

18:12 JG: And are we going back now to 1977?

18:17 S1: We came back to 1976-1977.

18:19 JG: 1976-1977?

18:21 S1: Yeah.We are, yeah.

18:22 JG: What regiment were you, sir?

18:23 S1: Devon and Dorset.

18:24 JG: And did Jones come from…

18:26 S1: He’s a Devon and Dorset, yeah.

18:28 JG: He did, yeah.

18:28 S1: But he was in my platoon.

18:30 JG: Was he, sir?

18:31 S1: Yeah.

18:32 JG: I didn’t know that you’re adding something…

18:34 S1: Yeah. Well, it’s in the book, you see.

18:35 JG: I did know all of them.

18:37 S1: Yes.

18:38 JG: But I didn’t know… And I knew, clearly, because the Force Research Unit didn’t come into operation till 1980.

18:46 S1: He was transferred to the Force Research Unit after he left the Devon and Dorset.

18:51 JG: What’s his first name, sir?

18:53 S1: Peter. PJ. Peter Jones.

18:55 JG: Peter Jones.

18:56 S1: Yeah. It’s all in the book.

18:58 JG: He then became Int. Corps, didn’t he?

19:00 S1: Well, he never did it. He never re-badged.

19:03 JG: He never re-badged.

19:04 S1: But he’s attached to the Intelligence Corps.

19:06 JG: Yeah. The FRU was an Int. Corps sponsored unit. But he never re-badged, did he?

19:11 S1: He never rebadged. He’s still a Devon and Dorset to this day.

19:13 JG: Was he promoted to FRU, sir?

19:15 S1: He was promoted all the way through to WOII. And he’s a very, very brave man. He got the deuce. He got the George class.

19:26 JG: Was he referred to as Paddy?

19:28 S1: No, never. No.

19:30 JG: No. Did he wear a… I mean it’s a stupid thing, sir. Did he ever wear it like a donkey jacket?

19:35 S1: I’m sure he did, yeah.

19:38 JG: That was something that was written in one of the documents which characterised one of the handlers. So would he have stayed in theatre in the ’80s, in the early ’80s?

19:50 S1: Yes, he was there in the early ’80s. Yeah, absolutely.

19:53 JG: Was he, sir?

19:54 S1: Yeah.

19:55 JG: I don’t think I’ve seen his name in the documentation that I’ve…

20:00 S1: Well, if you read chapter 4 my book, you’ll find the whole history of that.

20:03 JG: Okay. So, I didn’t read that chapter after. I admit, sir, my research has been lacking in that department. I didn’t appreciate that you dealt…

20:11 S1: Yeah. He’s a very important man.

20:14 JG: Absolutely, sir. And he’s still alive and well?

20:17 S1: He’s still alive and well. Anyway, just getting back to what I was saying, when I started to write this book, I’ve written that chapter first because he was the one who was most accessible to me because I knew him very well and I discussed it with him and he was very happy of me to write about it. Then he said, “Life got to go on. I’ve got to get a job,” and so on and so forth. By this time, of course, he was out of the army.

20:40 JG: Okay, sir. Presumably, the MOD were happy for you to write about Scappaticci?

20:48 S1: Well, the MOD weren’t happy, obviously, but they just miss the point that I was trying to make. The MOD was very anxious about it. I mean, I used to get a letter from the chairman of the D List committee who was then a chap called Nick Wilkinson, who was a friend of mine.

21:03 JG: Yeah.

21:07 S1: Nick Wilkinson.

21:08 JG: Nick Wilkinson, yeah.

21:10 S1: I used to get a letter from him.

21:12 JG: Yeah.

21:13 S1: And then, I used to say, which is what I’ll tell you, that my book was a attribute to all those who served in NI, whether they were military, or whether they were civilian, or whether whatever they were.

21:22 JG: Mr. Wilkinson would come from the same school as you?

21:26 S1: Absolutely. So he did it in it’s entirety. Anyway, then the heat went off it and I took… And because it took such a long time to produce because of the Bloody Sunday inquiry.

21:39 JG: Yeah.

21:39 S1: Well, that’s another story. The heat went right out of it. And this is my point I’m coming to, I was very conscious all the way through about the chap we called the “Steak Knife.” And I did not want to jeopardise him because I’ve grown up to the fact that that was one of our best secret and our best assets, and our most important secret.

22:05 JG: And presumably, Mr. Jones would never go to camera on matters?

22:10 S1: He would never get public, no.

22:11 JG: Okay. Presumably, you would never want to go public on this sort of thing?

22:16 S1: I wouldn’t want to get public on that sort of thing, certainly not.

22:17 JG: No. I can fully understand that. So you just touched on a point before I bid you farewell, sir, because I don’t want take too much of your time.

22:28 S1: No, it’s fine.

22:29 JG: I know it’s a Saturday.

22:30 S1: I like talking about it, yeah.

22:31 JG: I was curious as to, clearly you with GOC, again, at a very, very crucial point when Steven’s inquiry was at its early days. Stevens comes in to theatre in ’89 and Stevens One. He’s about to be wound up, isn’t it, during your period?

22:54 S1: Yes. It was. He completed his task. And, of course, his investigation was most unwelcome to the RUC.

23:07 JG: And to the army?

23:08 S1: Well, it was unwelcome to the army as well but it was unwelcome particularly to the RUC, and I remember the Chief Constable said to me, don’t’ deal with Stevens direct. He must always only deal with him through me and I was very happy to do that.

23:23 JG: Did Stevens ever meet with you, sir?

23:25 S1: Well, he did, actually. He did come to see me, yes. He came to see me because of a chap called Gordon Kerr.

23:32 JG: Pardon. Who is he, sir?

23:34 S1: Gordon Kerr, who is a CO of the FRU, I think.

23:37 JG: Okay, sir. And did he come with you?

23:40 S1: No. Stevens came to see me because Gordon Kerr had got an OBE in the New Year’s Honours list?

23:49 JG: Right.

23:50 S1: And Stevens deduced that that must indicate that my predecessor–because I wasn’t there at the time–my predecessor must have been complicit in what the FRU were doing because otherwise he wouldn’t have got an OBE.

24:02 JG: I see, yeah.

24:03 S1: And I said to Stevens, “You don’t know what you’re talking about.” People get awards for service going back for years and years and years and years. It’s not for a particular issue or a particular item.

24:16 JG: So he took that to be an indicator that…

24:18 S1: He took that to be an indication that the army, at the highest level, was complicit in what he, Stevens, thought was going on.

24:27 JG: I understand, Sir. And did he ever…

24:29 S1: So that was the only time I met him. He had no issues with me personally.

24:33 JG: Did he ever raise Scappaticci with you, Sir?

24:37 S1: No never did, no. And the next time I saw, anything to do with Stevens, was when he actually outed Scappaticci, or whatever you call him.

24:44 JG: Yeah.

24:45 S1: And I was absolutely, completely dumbfounded because a policeman protects his sources at all times.

24:56 JG: Why do you think that happened, sir?

24:59 S1: Well, I think he obviously thought that Steak Knife was guilty of some crime and that this was his vengeance on that.

25:09 JG: Do you think that he was guilty of any crimes?

25:15 S1: Well, I only heard one side of the story, that he saved hundreds and hundreds of lives.

25:20 JG: But you saw his product presumably, as GOC.

25:23 S1: Well, I didn’t ever see his product linked to his name.

25:25 JG: No, I appreciate that, sir.

25:27 S1: Ever.

25:27 JG: But you would see because of the matters which were being reported in the MISR’s and the other documents which were generated, that he was working in a very crucial, sensitive unit.

25:41 S1: I knew he was working in a sensitive role and I knew what he was doing and what his job was, and I knew that that put pressure on him enormously. But I was always told–and of course, I had nobody to check this out–I was always told that he had saved thousands, hundreds of lives I think.

26:04 JG: You clearly understand his sensitive role to be within the internal security unit?

26:11 S1: I understood that was his role. That was his final role. I mean he worked his way up through the IRA, didn’t he?

26:16 JG: He did, sir, but from the very early 1980’s, he was in the internal security.

26:21 S1: Absolutely, so that was his role.

26:24 JG: And clearly I suppose the point that I’m making sir and again, I don’t expect you to ever go in a public fashion on this point, but in the internal security unit, his job is to interrogate suspected informers. And he, in the Eamon Collins book, “Killing Rage”, he recounts how Mr. Scappaticci was involved in shooting a suspected informer. Now, clearly, you saw products, because I’ve seen some of these documents which detail his involvements in these incidents, let’s not say they are crimes because clearly a crime suggests criminal activity and if you’re doing it on behalf of the state there’s no crime. That would be the argument advanced.

27:15 S1: Well, the argument is that you balance the good with the bad, don’t’t you?

27:18 JG: That’s the point.

27:21 S1: On balance, it comes out that you’re getting more value. The state’s getting more value than it is…

27:25 JG: So in essence sir, what I’m saying is that the GOC is the person ultimately responsible in theatre for the force research unit. You were happy, or not happy that’s the wrong word, but you were confident that the profit and loss account was greater in profit that it was in minus.

27:44 S1: Well, I must correct you on something. You say the GOC was responsible. The Force Research Unit worked for MI5 and for the RUC, and all the product went to them. So I was responsible only for feeding them, administering them and promoting them and preparing with them…

28:02 JG: I understand sir. They were a force unit…

28:04 S1: They were a force unit, and they were not my unit.

28:07 JG: Yes I appreciate that sir, but in theatre, if you look at the… We’ve seen the ORBAT for the unit. And although, it is funded by direct to special services, Special Forces, and hence, the reason why they get special force pay, ultimately responsibility for that unit was tagged to GOC Northern Ireland.

28:30 S1: Only administrative, I can assure you, not operationally.

28:34 JG: No, I’m not saying operation sir, because they wrote to the operational…

28:38 S1: So I had to be satisfied that they were acting legally and within their charter.

28:45 JG: And were you satisfied?

28:47 S1: I was told always that they were.

28:48 JG: Were you satisfied they were acting legally?

28:51 S1: I was, yes, absolutely.

28:53 JG: So as the GOC, if you thought Mr. Scappaticci was involved in the internal security unit and interrogating a suspect and that person is then murdered, that would be lawful would it?

29:12 S1: No, it wouldn’t have been lawful, and it would have been something which I would have queried.

29:16 JG: And that’s the point that I’m making. So there was a fire break, was there, to your knowledge in the sense. You saw the product but you couldn’t be associated with the act?

29:27 S1: That is correct.

29:28 JG: So that act would then… If I’m right in thinking, was that done deliberately to protect the five, sir?

29:36 S1: I don’t think so, no. I think it was for security purposes, for secrecy purposes.

29:39 JG: Yeah, so people…

29:41 S1: The sensitivity was such that intelligence is held at the very, very highest level.

29:46 JG: No, I appreciate that sir, but as you know yourself, there’s always vast amounts of documentation which is generated to run an agent like Mr. Scappaticci.

29:58 S1: Absolutely.

29:58 JG: And that needs all documented in the most minute of detail, everything from the pickup routes, to the welfare, to the amount he was being paid. And all that is collected over two and a half decades.

30:14 S1: Yes.

30:14 JG: But the point that I’m making is you would never see that, would you?

30:17 S1: I would never see that.

30:17 JG: No. So indeed, presumably, and you might be able to answer this, would the Secretary of State be?

30:26 S1: I imagine the Secretary of State probably would but I don’t think either… Besides, I think the Secretary of State was, as I put in my book, he could never have known who the agent was. He would have known the code word, Steak Knife, or whatever it was.

30:38 JG: Yeah, and that’s to protect…

30:41 S1: And that is to protect him.

30:42 JG: So how is it you came into knowledge about Mr. Scappaticci?

30:46 S1: Only by keeping my eyes and ears open.

30:50 JG: No, what I mean is, when you met him.

30:53 S1: Oh, because I told you, the Head of Intelligence in Northern Ireland came to say, “We got a problem.”

30:58 JG: No, what I meant is… That’s what I mean, so the Head of Intelligence comes to you and he says, “We have a problem. Can you help me, sir?”

31:05 S1: Absolutely.

31:06 JG: I need you to have a meeting to reassure Mr. Scappaticci. Did that surprise you that he would come to in such an open way?

31:15 S1: No, because I said to him when I arrived in the job, I said, “If you ever you need any help, let me know.” I mean it’s a typical, typical, sort of general type of remark.
[chuckle]

31:22 JG: Absolutely, sir.

31:23 S1: You arrive, and you say, “Hello everybody. I’m John Wilsey. I want you to know, I’m here to help.”
[laughter]

31:32 JG: Sir, I understand exactly where you’re coming from. It’s just…

31:35 S1: And I knew their head of intelligence, they were indeed.

31:39 JG: Who was it at that time, sir?

31:41 S1: Well, I don’t think I better tell you. Well, his name is Colin Powers.

31:46 JG: Yeah, a Northern Irish gentleman?

31:49 S1: He comes from the North, yeah.

31:51 JG: Yeah, I know him, sir. Had he come back to the Force Research Unit in 1993? Because he was there…

32:00 S1: I think, he has, yes.

32:02 JG: He was there back in the early ’80s because he’s on the…

32:07 S1: What he was one who is very concerned I was writing this book, I know that.

32:11 JG: Colin Powers?

32:12 S1: Yes.

32:13 JG: And to be fair, sir. I suppose we can all understand why he would be concerned.

32:20 S1: Absolutely. No, I have no difficulty with it, but my story was… The subliminal part of my story is ta tribute is paid to all of us and he has never been paid before.

32:30 JG: Yeah.

32:32 S1: And so, for the greater good, my book tells the story of the greater good rather than the detailed analysis.

32:39 JG: Did you ever meet the handler, sir, or who was there at the time, when you met with Mr. Scappaticci, a guy called Mr. Moyles?

32:45 S1: No, I never met him. No.

32:47 JG: You never met him?

32:48 S1: No.

32:49 JG: So when you met with Scappaticci, who was present?

32:52 S1: I think Colin Powers. I think Colin Powers, probably.

32:56 JG: And just you, sir?

32:57 S1: And me, yeah. It may just been the two of us together. I can’t honestly remember.

33:01 JG: And how long did that meeting take place, sir? Just sort of…

33:03 S1: About half an hour.

33:04 JG: And that was it? And you never saw him again afterwards?

33:07 S1: Well, no, I never saw him again in Northern Ireland afterwards.

33:12 JG: But did you see him out of Northern Ireland?

33:15 S1: I’ve seen him since, yes.

33:17 JG: In what side of situation would you…

33:20 S1: Well, he had a problem and again, I said to him, “If you ever have a problem, let me know.”

33:24 JG: But how would he make contact with you, sir?

33:27 S1: I didn’t know how he made it. Probably the same way as you did.

33:30 JG: [laughter] I hope not, not through the D-notice. And his problem was because he’d been exposed?

33:37 S1: Well, it was a legal difficulty that he had.

33:45 JG: Alright, okay.

33:46 S1: And who was going to pay for it, and so and so. Who’s going to pay for legal advice and so on?

33:50 JG: Yeah. And Ministry of Defence pick up his legal fees, don’t they?

33:54 S1: Well, absolutely, but only on matters bearing on whose activity at the time.

34:01 JG: Yeah. I know his civil matters or contingency are paid separately. He asked it from them. But clearly, matters when he’s dealing with his work, I think he’s actually featuring in the tribunal in the republic at the moment.

34:22 S1: Sure.

34:23 JG: And he gets from the FRU, doesn’t he? As in…

34:26 S1: Well, I think that was the trouble. I think there were errors where he wasn’t being funded and that’s what he wanted help over.

34:34 JG: Did you know anything of this solicitor, sir?

34:37 S1: Not at all. I passed it probably onto the right quarter.

34:41 JG: Okay, sir. And they dealt with it?

34:45 S1: Well, I imagined. I never heard from him again.

34:46 JG: So he was satisfied. [chuckle] Alright, can I leave you, sir? You’ve given me plenty to think about before… Can I come back to you next week and, perhaps, at your convenience, I could come down and see you, sir, off the record?

34:58 S1: Yeah, go on. Come and see me, by all means do. I’m not taking part in any program or anything like that.

35:02 JG: No sir, I know that. I don’t expect you at all to go to cameras, sir. But it would be helpful, so we get the story, correct. I mean, clearly, as a five-star general, you would be in a very privileged position. I don’t expect you to give me any secrets that you aren’t comfortable with, but if I show you some documentation, then you can put us, either to that it’s a serious matter or it could possibly be used, and we would respect that.

35:36 S1: Okay.

35:37 JG: Is that fine, sir?

35:38 S1: Yeah.

35:39 JG: If I’ve got any questions tomorrow, sir, if I think it over today, would it be possible that I could give you a ring?

35:44 S1: Yeah, of course. Give us a ring, yeah.

35:46 JG: Alright, sir. Well, I won’t disturb your Saturday afternoon any further and hope…

35:51 S1: No, it’s nice talking to you.

35:52 JG: I hope you pick the winner of the Grand National, sir.

35:54 S1: Thank you very much. Who’s it going to be?

35:57 JG: I am a favourite man, sir, so I think I’ll be going for Ginger McCain at the Ballabriggs…

36:04 S1: Great. Okay. Nice talking to you.

36:05 JG: And you, sir.

36:06 S1: Say again your name?

36:06 JG: Thank you. Bye.

36:08 S1: Bye.

36:08 JG: Bye, Sir.

-END-

With One Bound, Trump Frees Himself From Putin’s Shadow

I have learned two lessons during my many years as a journalist. One is that the media hunts as a pack, or herd if you prefer, and one major reason for that is that it is safer to run with the herd. Everyone goes in the same direction and if it turns out to be the wrong direction, well who can blame you?

The other lesson is that more often than not, the herd charges the wrong way.

Niall O’Dowd Answers Critics On ‘Irish Were Slaves’ Row!

Niall O’Dowd tries but falls at the first hurdle…..

Danielomastix's avatarcassidyslangscam

A couple of days ago, Niall O’Dowd published a reply to those academics who put their name to Liam Hogan’s open letter criticising him for an article on IrishCentral which supports the idea that the seventeenth-century Irish were victims of enslavement and pointing out that the word slave is an emotive one with a specific meaning. You can find the reply here: http://www.irishcentral.com/opinion/niallodowd/why-the-irish-were-both-slaves-and-indentured-servants-in-colonial-america These Irish people were indentured servants or bonded labourers. Their plight was bad, the circumstances of their kidnap and deportation distressing. But Liam Hogan and others are at pains to point out that they were not chattel slaves the way generations of African-Americans were.

O’Dowd pretty much admits this and claims to deplore the way that the slave label has been used by right-wing groups to play down the legacy of slavery among African Americans.

The controversy has arisen because some far-right groups have claimed that the…

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Was Martin McGuinness A British Agent? – Toby Harnden Asks The Question

This article was originally published in The Sunday Times (Irish Edition) and reprinted in Real Clear Politics. Enjoy:

McGuinness: The Slippery Shadow in Irish Dirty War

By Toby Harnden
March 31, 2017

Towards the end of my time as a reporter in Northern Ireland I had a dream in which I was opening an envelope. In it, I had been told, was a list of all the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries who had been secret agents for the British intelligence services.

Even in the dream it felt as if all my senses were tingling in anticipation of being given the key to unlocking the greatest mysteries and contradictions of the Irish Troubles. But when I took the piece of paper out and unfolded it, it was blank.

That was in the late 1990s. I had a similar sense of anticlimax when — nearly 18 years on — the death of Martin McGuinness at the age of 66 was announced last week.

There were the inevitable salutes, cloaked in a green mist, to his status as a sainted Irish revolutionary hero. And of course the equally predictable condemnations of him as a blood-soaked terrorist who should rot in hell.

Between these extremes was the comfortable narrative of the type beloved by western liberals that here was a man of violence who laid down his gun and instead took up the cause of peace and democracy in a Damascene conversion.

None of this contributed much more to any greater understanding of what happened in the Troubles than the blank piece of paper in my dream.

Irish republicans never underwent a moral transformation. Their pursuit of a united Ireland involved both slaughter and negotiation.

In fact the two things were always inextricably linked. The “Tuas” doctrine drawn up after the 1994 ceasefire stood for “tactical use of the armed struggle” and not — as some naive British officials hoped — “totally unarmed strategy”.

Neither the brickbats nor the bouquets did much justice to the immense complexity of McGuinness’s career. He graduated from being a butcher’s apprentice in Derry to a fearless IRA fighter before becoming a de facto commander who occupied every senior IRA position.

Ultimately he became the chief negotiator for the IRA’s political wing, Sinn Fein, playing a central role in brokering the 1998 Good Friday agreement, which ushered in a flawed peace. Perhaps most remarkably he struck up a genuine rapport with Ian Paisley, Ulster’s erstwhile “Dr No”, as the unlikely duo — dubbed the “Chuckle Brothers” — co-governed the province’s six counties.

That’s not all. Just as most news reports of McGuinness’s passing omitted the fact that he had been part of the IRA army council that ordered the 1996 South Quay bombing in London’s Docklands, they also ignored one of the central questions about him.

Put bluntly, if that piece of paper in my dream had not been blank, would the name Martin McGuinness have been on it?

On the face of it the very notion is preposterous. As leader of the IRA’s Derry Brigade after Bloody Sunday in 1972, McGuinness had almost certainly killed dozens of British soldiers and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers.

While Gerry Adams’s operational experience as an IRA volunteer had been minimal, McGuinness was a military man, respected and feared in equal measure.

The case that McGuinness was a British agent — opinion is divided as to whether it was MI5 or MI6 — is mainly circumstantial but has been longstanding and propounded by a variety of diverse figures. Over the past 15 years it has become clear that the Provisionals were thoroughly infiltrated by the British state.

In 2003 Alfredo Scappaticci, known as Freddie or “Scap” and head of the IRA’s infamous “nutting squad” that interrogated and murdered informers, was himself unmasked as an informer. Codenamed “Stakeknife”, he had been in the pay of the British since 1978.

A little over two years later, it was the turn of Denis Donaldson, a senior Sinn Fein aide and confidant of Adams who had worked for the RUC and MI5 for two decades. He was shot dead by the IRA at a farmhouse in Co Donegal a few months later.

Since the 1999 publication of my book Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh, I have received confirmation that the April 1997 arrest by the SAS of an IRA sniper team was based on information provided by an informer that led to listening devices being planted at a remote farm.

The arrest operation at the farm was a pivotal event in undermining the IRA’s military campaign and boosting the case being made by Adams and McGuinnese that political talks were the way ahead.

Any doubt that men at the heart of the republican movement responsible for continued murder and mayhem could have been British agents had vanished.

Despite his military record McGuinness had long been a proponent of negotiations. Sean MacStiofain, the Provisional IRA’s first chief of staff, claimed to Anthony McIntyre, a former IRA man who served 18 years in jail, that McGuinness was lobbying for a ceasefire as far back as 1972.

A declassified British military document carried an account of a meeting in May 1973 between two of the most senior British Army officers involved in the Troubles during which the existence of a source, apparently named “Brocolli”.

General Sir Frank King, who commanded British troops in Northern Ireland from February 1973 and August 1975 and General Sir David Fraser, Vice Chief of the General Staff, were apparently concerned about “the problem” of the source’s protection.

Brian Keenan, the veteran IRA leader who died of cancer in 2008, suspected that McGuinness had set him up for arrest at a roadblock in 1979. Keenan was wanted at the time and was suspicious that McGuinness had flagged him down shortly beforehand, alerting the security forces to the car he was in.

In his powerful book A Secret History of the IRA, Ed Moloney, a veteran journalist with unrivalled Provisional contacts, laid out details of the charmed life that McGuinness led while he promoted men suspected of being informers and IRA operations that he oversaw were infiltrated.

Eight IRA men were killed in an SAS ambush at Loughgall, Co Armagh, in 1987, the biggest death toll for the organisation in any single incident since 1921. Those who perished were regarded as being among the most militant members of the IRA, whose East Tyrone Brigade was adamantly opposed to the talks strategy being drawn up by Adams and McGuinness.

Somehow the IRA plan to blow up an RUC station had been completely compromised, although it’s possible that it was electronic surveillance rather than treachery that led to the SAS operation.

The previous year, the IRA’s Northern Command had been given the power to vet planned attacks to avoid them conflicting with Sinn Fein’s political plans. The head of Northern Command was none other than McGuinness.

One of the most notorious atrocities of the Troubles was the “human bomb” attack on the Coshquin checkpoint in 1990. Patsy Gillespie, 42, a Catholic canteen worker at Fort George army base, was abducted at his home in Derry and ordered to drive a lorry loaded with explosives to the checkpoint.

Rather than allowing Gillespie time to escape, as had been previous IRA practice, the bomb was detonated by remote control as he reached the checkpoint. Five soldiers were killed and the largest part of Gillespie’s body to be recovered was part of his hand.

In an IRA statement authorised by McGuinness, who had approved the operation, Gillespie was described as having deserved death because he had been “a part of the British war machine”.

In 2006 a former British soldier using the pseudonym Martin Ingram, who had been an informant handler in the army’s Force Research Unit (FRU), produced the transcript of a tape that he said was an intercepted conversation between McGuinness — codenamed J118 — and “G”, an MI6 officer.

During their conversation the two men talked about the upcoming Coshquin attack, which appeared to be the MI6 officer’s idea.

The murder of Gillespie caused an entirely predictable uproar even among Catholics normally supportive of the IRA. The attack had been approved by McGuinness and the IRA leadership.

“One thing can be said with certainty,” Moloney wrote. “The human bomb tactic fortified the peace camp within the Provisionals and weakened the militarists.”

Could MI6 really have colluded in the slaughter of five British soldiers in order to nudge the IRA towards peace? It seems far-fetched. But the Troubles were not described as “the dirty war” for nothing.

Certainly on occasion the British authorities were prepared to arrange murders for what was judged to be a greater good.

During research Bandit Country I established that the IRA bomb maker Paddy Flood, who was nicknamed “warhead” and was killed as an informer by the IRA in 1990, had been set up by the British to protect another informer, Martin Hogan, a senior Derry IRA man.

Flood, subjected to a brutal interrogation in a south Armagh barn, had given a false confession. His body was found dumped in a bin bag on the border.

A year later Hogan was spirited away from Derry by his handlers and given a new identity abroad.

The Coshquin attack effectively marked the end of the road for the IRA in Derry— the five soldiers who died that day were its last military victims.

Derry’s IRA brigade had been riddled with informers. Among them was Frank Hegarty, shot dead in 1986 after being lured home by McGuinness with a promise of immunity. The more suspicious in the brigade noted Hegarty had been promoted by McGuinness though there had been rumours he might have been a British agent.

It was notable, moreover, that the IRA was effectively shut down in Derry long before it was neutralised elsewhere — and that the senior commander there was McGuinness.

Raymond Gilmour was a Derry IRA informer who fled the city in 1982 and died of apparent natural causes at the age of 56 in Kent last year. He once used to wake up screaming after nightmares that McGuinness was about to shoot him but later concluded that the future Sinn Fein chief negotiator was, like him, a British agent.

Adams and McGuinness seemed to have calculated as early as the 1980s that the Irish war was destined to be a stalemate

“I could never understand how I was allowed to run so long and do so much damage,” he said in 2006. “Now I can see McGuinness was looking out for me.”

Around the same time, a former RUC Special Branch officer told The Sunday Times that McGuinness had been an informer codenamed “Fisherman”.

What could have motivated McGuinness to betray the IRA? Adams was always openly hostile towards me, a journalist with the pro-unionist, conservative Daily Telegraph. The first words he spoke to me when I challenged him on his assertion that he had no idea what the IRA was thinking were the distinctly menacing: “Who are you?”

Officially The Daily Telegraph did not talk to Sinn Fein in those days — though I regularly met IRA members as part of my book research in south Armagh — and Sinn Fein would speak to the British government but not The Daily Telegraph.

McGuinness and I would exchange glances and he would nod at me, as if to acknowledge that he knew the way things were. Years later we met at a St Patrick’s Day event in Washington and he shook my hand warmly. He was enjoying his role as deputy first minister — a minister of the British
crown — and was full of bonhomie.

One intriguing nugget in the late Liam Clarke’s definitive biography Martin McGuinness: From Guns to Government, a biography he co-wrote with his wife, Kathryn Johnston, was that McGuinness was “prone to attacks of depression, which were sometimes severe . . . they were followed by fits of elation”.

Such a vulnerability — or others we may not have known about — could have provided the intelligence agencies with leverage.

The most plausible theory perhaps is that while he was never in the pay of the British, he — along with Adams — was regarded as an “agent of influence” by MI5 and MI6, a force for encouraging the Provisionals to move towards politics.

After all, the pair had been involved in political talks with British officials and MI6 at Cheyne Walk, in London’s Chelsea, in 1972. As the Troubles wore on, it seemed increasingly that they were being protected by the British government for fear of them being supplanted by more militaristic figures.

Detective Superintendent Ian Phoenix, head of the RUC’s surveillance unit, who was killed in the 1994 Chinook helicopter crash at Mull of Kintyre, wrote in his diaries that surveillance of McGuinness and other Sinn Fein leaders was curtailed in 1993, a decision he viewed to be a result of political pressure.

If the political will had been there, a criminal conviction on charges of directing terrorism would have been a virtual inevitability.

In 1998 Mickey Donnelly, a veteran Derry republican who had been critical of the Good Friday agreement, was subjected to a vicious beating as punishment for his dissent. Donnelly’s wife, Martina, confronted McGuinness on his doorstep, telling him he was a “traitor” to the cause of Irish unity.

Donnelly commented: “It shows that McGuinness and some of his henchmen are a protected species: they are safe from arrest as long as they do not attack the British forces or the loyalists.”

In 2009 McGuinness himself referred to dissident republicans as “traitors to the island of Ireland” for the murder of Stephen Carroll, a Catholic police officer shot dead by the Real IRA in Co Armagh. It was the type of IRA operation he would have considered routine 20 years earlier.

Adams and McGuinness seemed to have calculated as early as the 1980s that the Irish war was destined to be a stalemate. The IRA was too compromised and contained to achieve victory but its capacity to bomb England meant the British were prepared to make huge concessions.

By persuading the British that the cure for the disease — the Troubles — was disengagement, they might actually bring about what the disease itself could not. That, at least, is what supporters of Adams and McGuinness believe.

The alternative is that one or both of them were co-opted, even recruited, by the British state to subvert the IRA’s aims. If so, then some of those now condemning McGuinness as an unrepentant terrorist might have to revise their opinions. Irish republicans would regard him as a figure of infamy.

But the likelihood is that the paper in that dreamt-of envelope will always remain blank, or at least incomplete.

Asked about McGuinness’s death last week, Gillespie’s widow, Kathleen, said she had always wanted answers but she feared “the truth died” when the Sinn Fein leader took his final breath.

Truth was always an elusive concept during the Troubles, and McGuinness doubtless took many of its darkest secrets to his grave.

Toby Harnden is the Washington bureau chief of The Sunday Times. You can follow him on Twitter here.

This article originally appeared in The Sunday Times. It is reprinted here with permission.

Toby Harnden is the Washington bureau chief of The Sunday Times. You can follow him on Twitter here.
This article originally appeared in The Sunday Times. It is reprinted here with permission.

The Paisley-McGuinness Movie Trailer

If you buy popcorn on the way in, you’ll probably need a zinc bucket as well. This is what happens when Hollywood meets history. A comic version of what actually happened. Utterly beyond words! Cynically released by IFC Films now because of McGuinness’ death I suspect, otherwise it was destined to bomb spectacularly, if you’ll forgive the phrase.

Donald Trump’s Fiendishly Clever Climate Plan Is Unveiled

Thanks to CM for this: